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with diffusing knowledge, not creating it. They did not doubt that ultimate cures for diseases of the body corporeal and the body politic would come from research, but the greatest opportunities for immediate results seemed to lie in more efficient use of existing knowledge.
Foundations' organizational style clashed with scientists' habits of individualistic laissez-faire. Foundations were part of the movement toward consolidation of large national institutions, the same movement that was creating business oligopolies and trusts.8 Foundation leaders saw their unique role in history as applying methods of big business to community activities-education, health, welfare-that had traditionally been regarded as expressions of individual virtue. For them, direct aid to individuals was retrogressive; their aim was to coordinate individual and local activities into collective programs directed by national institutions.9 Foundations favored causes that displayed collective purpose and modern business organization. Few academic scientists displayed those qualities in 1915. In order for a partnership to develop between foundations and university science, a rationale had to be devised that served the institutional purposes of both parties. Not surprisingly, it was the endowed research institutes, not the foundations, that took the first steps toward a working relationship. Both the Carnegie Institution of Washington and the Rockefeller Institute had research grant programs. The Carnegie Institution was by far the largest extramural source of funds for academic scientists before 1920-over $100,000 per year. However, the experiment was by no means an unqualified success, either for the Institution's president, Robert S. Woodward, or for his academic clients. The use of student research assistants was especially divisive. Woodward saw this practice as a diversion of research funds to teaching; professors complained that Woodward did not appreciate the importance of linking research and training. Embittered, Woodward lost no opportunity to express his conviction that universities were no place for real research. Simon Flexner, the director of the Rockefeller Institute, also became an articulate and well-placed advocate of an institutional separation of research and teaching.
Observing the unhappy experiences of the Carnegie and Rockefeller grants programs, foundation leaders avoided entanglements with university scientists. In 1915, for example, the veteran grant getter Edward C. Pickering asked the Rockefeller Foundation to give $50,000 for a program of small grants-in-aid to be administered by a committee of the AAAS. Rockefeller secretary Jerome Greene politely but firmly declined, for fear of "diverting a great Foundation from its true function of experiment, discovery, initiative, and demonstration, to being a mere bag of money.'"10 Greene and others were not indifferent to science: quite the contrary, they were sympathetic and even eager to support science in some way. But what way? No foundation could risk becoming a passive partner in routine research by rank-and-file teachers: such a role would betray its most cherished institutional mission. Philanthropists and academic scientists alike assumed that the measure of a successful grant was the output of research papers by an individual, not the training of new talents or the building of a departmental program. The parties could not agree on procedures that would ensure success, however, and the lack of a broader basis of common interest in improving the research community made a meeting of minds difficult.
What broke the impasse was the linkage of research to the expansion of graduate training. Communities of scientists, rather than individuals per se, became the common cause of university and foundation leaders. This supply-side strategy satisfied philanthropists that they were developing a community vital to the nation's well-being. As the sole producers of scientists, universities finally had a strategic advantage over research institutes. In 1916 Thomas Hunt Morgan hatched a scheme for the Rockefeller Foundation involving grants for training researchers. Significantly, Pickering misunderstood its novelty and force, perceiving it merely as an aid to education instead of to research, and thus a competitor to his own scheme.1" Morgan's proposal never reached the Rockefeller Foundation. Within a few years, however, the idea that informed it became the basis of a new partnership between foundations and university scientists.
Led by the Rockefeller and Carnegie groups, foundation grants for research in universities increased a hundredfold by the mid 1920s, dwarfing the Carnegie Institution's grant program (see Table 1 ). No less important, programs of research fellowships and grants to specific departments or projects replaced gifts of general endowment and individual grants-in-aid. The prewar pattern of scattered aid to the rank and file gave way to programs concentrating on specific scientific communities and institutions. Philanthropists became active partners in training researchers and improving opportunities for research in universities.
This trend was not immediately apparent to academic observers, who worried that philanthropists still seemed to favor research institutes. There The conventional view of the relation between the university and the foundation is that the university is the active and the foundation the passive element. ... While there is a certain element of truth in the conventional picture, . . . foundation grants are coming more and more to be in support of specific projects, and the initiative for these projects may come from anywhere-from an individual, from a foundation, from a university, or perhaps most often from one of the national organizations of scholars. ... I do not think it an exaggeration to say that any important research project which has the endorsement of a representative group of scholars can find support from one or another of the foundations.13
Keppel noted that foundations were investing large sums in graduate and postgraduate training: no fewer than 1,500 fellowships a year, he estimated. Also, foundations were drawing on universities for their program managers and for advice in selecting grants. They in turn aided interdisciplinary projects and publicized news of research trends. Foundations and universities were partners "in the same great enterprise, the advancement of human knowledge."-14
Keppel put his finger on some of the chief reasons for the new sense of trust and partnership between foundations and university scientists. The ability of the National Research Council to plan and manage collective research projects allayed philanthropists' fears of academic individualism. Participation in such cooperative projects also lessened academic fears of outside interference. Most important, research was perceived by both parties, not just as an end in itself, but as an essential element in educating socially progressive elites. It was the organizational and cultural implications of science, more than its purely intellectual or even practical benefits, that appealed to philanthropists.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN SCIENCE
Scientific and philanthropic purposes were united by a shared conception of "community development." Although this phrase was not common usage at the time, it expresses the essence of the larger social system of which science patronage was a part. Foundations had always been concerned with social institutions in education, public health, charity, and social welfare; in the 1920s they began to treat scientists in the same fashion. The strategy of community development can be seen in every aspect of philanthropic work in the 1920s. Programs in public health, education, housing, social work, parks and playgrounds, child welfare agencies, health care centers, and so on all aimed at developing the structure and collective spirit of some community of people. Groups suffering from particular handicaps or diseases or exposed to particular risks and members of particular age groups each became the object of a specialized philanthropy.'5 The few programs aimed at the sciences were part of this larger social movement and must be understood in that context.
Historians of philanthropy have emphasized the individual character of foundation fellowship and grant programs.'6 But it is the collective, communitarian character of foundation programs in the 1920s that sets them apart from the truly individualistic prewar style of science patronage. Foundation leaders did speak the language of individual merit, of course, and grants were generally made to individuals rather than institutions. However, such grants were made to individuals in their capacity as leaders of research communities and as institution builders. The purpose of foundation programs was to develop the institutional infrastructure of science; to promote a programmatic style of research, and to encourage cooperation among scientists. Programs of fellowships and project grants were designed to produce a new generation of elite scientists and to create a system of centers for scientific development. Foundation leaders were system builders and turned to science in the same systematic way that they had to the nation's colleges, medical schools, or public health agencies. Wickliffe Rose's slogan "make the peaks higher" captures the meritocratic collectivist spirit of science patronage in the 1920s.
The emerging partnership between foundations and university science grew out of a shared concern with the supply of scientific manpower, which became a cause for alarm in the early 1920s. World War I dramatically and permanently expanded nonacademic markets for scientists at the same time that mobilization temporarily reduced the supply. Business mistrust of ivory-tower scientists had begun to erode before 1916, when wartime military research and development programs gave academics the chance to display their practical problem-solving skills. Their success sharpened manufacturers' desire to get the best researchers 15 for their laboratories. Meanwhile, the supply of science graduates was cut off. War projects had emptied universities of their teaching faculty in 1916, and the draft obliged young scientists to postpone professional training. These demographic disruptions gave rise to a manpower bottleneck. Though temporary, this bottleneck was a good opportunity for scientists to press their claims for more public support. University leaders were especially alert to the opportunities for a monopoly on the production of certified professional researchers.
The war also spawned new institutions for mobilizing science for national service. The most important of these was the National Research Council. Created by the activist minority of the conservative National Academy of Sciences, the Council was designed to expand and improve private science by linking it more closely to public purposes. The NRC enjoyed a degree of independence from the Academy, and an endowment of $5 million from the Carnegie Corporation in 1919 gave it an independent income to pursue its (moderately) collectivist ends.17 Among the chief goals of NRC activists George Ellery Hale, Arthur Noyes, Vernon Kellogg, and Robert Millikan was to tap foundation endowments for university research.
Heads of foundations and health agencies had made many personal contacts with scientists during the war. The experience of working together on great and pressing problems gave both parties a sense of mutual trust. The NRC's activist spirit persuaded philanthropists that scientists too had purposes transcending their parochial disciplinary interests. Table 2 Another sign of the evolving partnership between philanthropy and universities was the shift from general support to grants earmarked for research and training. This trend is evident in Eduard Lindemann's tabulations of the expenditures of a hundred large foundations and community trusts in the 1920s (see Table 3 ). Gifts to university endowment funds declined in fits and starts from over half the total to less than a quarter. Gifts for fellowships increased sharply in the first half of the decade, and grants to particular departments of learning rose sharply in the second half. Funds for specific research projects tripled.20 Similar patterns can be seen in foundation gifts to medicine and public health, with minor differences in timing (see Table 4 Unlike general educational fellowships, the NRC research fellowships had a strong directive effect on scientific communities. They were aimed at specific disciplines and attracted the best young talent to fashionable lines of research. They provided a pool of highly trained and mobile manpower for emerging centers like Stanford, Princeton, Michigan, and Caltech, as well as expanding graduate programs of older elite universities. Programmatic, selective, and efficiently administered, these fellowships played a major role in creating or importing new scientific specialties: for example, theoretical physics and general physiology.22
Many foundations followed the Rockefeller Foundation into the fellowship field (see Table 5 ), but only a few had programs as systematic and expertly managed: the Guggenheim Foundation, for example. The vast majority were local charities that included a fellowship or two among their diverse activities because it was fashionable. Frank Aydelotte recalled (disapprovingly) the flurry of small, often short-lived fellowship programs established just after the war, many on "very slender financial and intellectual foundations."23 The intentions behind these fellowship programs reflect the diverse ideals of postwar reconstruction. Many were devoted to improving international relations through cultural exchange and were supported by communities of hyphenated Americans. Such programs multiplied rapidly after the war, fed by strong feelings of solidarity with wartime allies, fear of revolutions and resurgent autocracies, hatred of German cultural imperialism, and ambition to take Germany's place at the center of world culture.24 These programs were not aimed at scientists; but with their strong internationalist ideology and European networks, scientists were well placed to take advantage of them. Manufacturers also set up more or less systematic fellowship programs, led by Du Pont and the food-processing industries. These programs were intended mainly to ensure privileged access to the supply of trained experts for industrial R & D departments.25 Hospitals and research institutes likewise used restricted fellowships to compete for scarce manpower.
Graduate fellowships also appealed to educational foundations faced with the enormous expansion of college enrollment in the 1920s. Borrowing techniques of professional fund-raisers, universities undertook large and highly successful endowment drives-an "epidemic," Frederick Keppel called it.26 With their fixed incomes, educational foundations realized that they must specialize if they were to serve "some distinctive purpose, and not merely add to the sum total of the great volume of expense."27 Graduate schools were a strategic leverage point for influencing the quality of higher education and were small enough for foundations to make an impact. The training of professionals had long been a subsidiary part of foundation programs in education, public health, and social work. As the need for services outgrew philanthropic means, training of academic research elites became an available and appealing next step for educational foundations looking for a vital but affordable mission.
Research grants were a more problematic means of supporting science than fellowships, because selecting projects involved technical know-how and direct dealing with individual researchers. Memory of past experience with small grants, plus real administrative difficulties, inhibited foundations from organizing such programs during the 1920s. It was mainly the largest, most progressive foundations that led the way. The Carnegie Corporation and Carnegie Institution, the International and General Education Boards, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial accounted for nine tenths of all research grant funds in the 1920s (see Table 6 ). Much of the rest came from small, specialized foundations, run by scientists, engineers, or physicians. It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that individual grants became a common way for middling foundations to invest in science.
The large foundations' research grant programs were not, strictly speaking, individual grants-in-aid but hybrids of individual and institutional grants. It was this hybrid character, in fact, that allayed foundation fears of research grants. Most commonly, funds were provided in the form of three-to seven-year block grants to departments or research groups led by productive and charismatic individuals. These block grants might be supplemented by personal grants-in-aid or by capital grants for facilities and equipment, but the goal was to develop local communities of scientific workers, not to aid any particular researcher or to support universities in general. It was the capacity of the system to expand and improve itself that mattered to foundations. They concentrated on a few institutions with the idea of building up centers of scientific achievement that would then serve as a demonstration and inspiration for the rank and file. The linkage of research and training was essential. NRC fellows gravitated to these centers, 25 serving as vectors of the best practice when they went on to teaching careers. Like the fellowship programs, project grants were seen as long-term investments in formal and informal institutions of scientific communities.
The strategy of community development in preference to individual aid made it possible for foundations to become patrons of science on a grand scale. Block grants delegated technical judgments of research priorities to scientific authorities, leaving philanthropists to assess entrepreneurial capacities, organizational needs, and the quality of institutions: matters that they, as professional organizers, were accustomed to decide on. Like Ruml, Rose adopted a strategy of concentrating resources in a few centers of research and training-making the peaks higher, to use his own slogan. His mode of operation was to identify productive, inspiring teachers and provide the material means to expand their programs into regional or national centers of scientific development.34 In practice, Rose operated in a rather more traditional way than Ruml, making more capital grants for buildings and equipment and fewer for group research in specific problem areas. Rose was not scientifically trained, and though he enjoyed talking shop with eminent scientists, he left scientific decisions to the experts. The IEB's programs were also less comprehensive in execution than in conception (see Table 7 ). The vast scope of his plans, plus local political and financial impediments, obliged Rose to seize opportunities as they arose.
In the United States, GEB programs were gradually brought into line with IEB ideals, but there too Rose was obliged to trim his sails to fit practical realities. The GEB's practice of pledging large sums contingent on matching funds meant that actual expenditures lagged years behind appropriations. The GEB had $9.4 million in outstanding commitments in 1919, one third of total appropriations since 1902.35 It was risky to initiate projects. GEB leaders in the early 1920s emphasized the need to phase out programs in general education, but even Rose found it difficult to do much in the five years before his retirement in 1928.
The distribution of GEB projects reveals a strategy of regional centers operating within an existing hierarchy of universities (see Table 8 several cases, aid to basic science departments followed from previous GEB investment in medical schools; at the University of Rochester, for example. Rose's old-fashioned cultural tastes also diverted him from the GEB's main purpose of building up graduate training. His two greatest projects were the Mt. Palomar Observatory and the Oriental Institute at Chicago: both more research institutes than training centers, and in areas closer to the cultural priorities of the 1880s than the 1920s.
In its multidisciplinary range and continental scope, Rose's ambition was, admittedly, not just grand but grandiose. The early 1920s were a time for utopian visions, however. Without the grand ideal of community development and social reconstruction, visionaries like Ruml and Rose would probably not have been In his brief tenure as president, Angell initiated several large programs in the sciences, which ultimately brought total expenditures to $16 million (see Table  9 ). However, he did not succeed in attaching the Corporation permanently to the cause of science. After he resigned in 1921 to become president of Yale University, his successors turned to new causes, and the nascent program in science was gradually discontinued.
That program reflected Angell's previous experiences as an academic administrator and head of the NRC. Defining education as the Corporation's overarching purpose, Angell saw the greatest organizational need in education in the areas of research and graduate training:
The graduate school, so-called, in our great American universities has not as yet fully found itself, and its attempt on the one hand to produce creative scientists and scholars has landed it in certain difficulties. . . . There is at this point a real possibility for an agency like the Corporation to do a constructive and significant piece of work. ... The intrinsic needs of our time, as well as the deep rooted interests of the founder, would lead me to urge that the Corporation commit itself as a matter of permanent policy to the furtherance of research.39 University departments were the key to Angell's program. He was less interested in sponsoring particular researches than in building an organized infrastructure for research. Improvement of scientific research was inextricably linked in his mind with the production of a new generation of elite researchers.
Despite his invocation of Carnegie's interest in education, Angell was in fact boldly departing from the Corporation's traditionally eclectic interests. The Corporation had been primarily a purse for Carnegie's other institutions and had relied on the Carnegie Institution to distribute its annual allocation for small grants-in-aid. Angell intended to take charge of allocation himself and to concentrate on large programmatic grants to institutions at the expense of specific researches and fellowships. He therefore initiated a series of grants to Caltech to develop research schools in physics, chemistry, and geology. These grants were continued, if without much enthusiasm, even after his departure. Angell also administered a grant of $5 million to the National Academy of Sciences. Part of this went to support the NRC's programs for developing science: to draw attention to new research fields, to improve scientists' communications among themselves and with the general public, and to raise funds from industry. Some members of the board disapproved of the new direction exemplified by these grants, but apparently the reform minority had caught them off guard.
But despite Angell's innovations and his sharing the same ambitions for science as the NRC activists and their Rockefeller patrons, the pattern of Corporation gifts was distinctly its own, even during his tenure. The grants to Caltech were the closest in spirit to the Rockefeller community development programs: these were middle-range project grants to centers of advanced training and research. Much more prominent, however, among the Corporation's disbursements are two large grants of endowment: the one to the NRC, engineered by Angell, and another to the Carnegie Institution, made by Keppel in 1925. Al- The Rockefeller Foundation was similarly hampered by internal politics from realizing the ideals of community development. The Foundation remained almost exclusively a silent partner, channeling funds for fellowships and research grants through committees of the NRC (see Table 10 ). This symbiotic relationship permitted philanthropists to aid specific research communities without creating an internal administrative bureaucracy, and without running the risk of making particular institutions dependent on outside patronage. Foundation president George Vincent was almost obsessively concerned in the early 1920s to avoid such entanglements.
Vincent's background resembled Angell's in many ways: the Midwest, academic social science, and a strong drift from scholarship to administration. However, the two moved in somewhat different social circles and had had different roles during the war. Vincent was not closely connected with the NRC crowd, and owing to the Rockefeller Foundation's leading role in public health, he moved most easily among leaders of reform movements in public health and social welfare. Like Angell, he was the first professional head of a major philanthropy, but he lacked Angell's concern with developing graduate schools. He too had to cope with powerful vested interests.
Vincent's chief problem was not with his trustees, as Angell's was-the Rockefeller Foundation was never the instrument of its founder and had always been more professionally managed than the Carnegie Corporation-but with entrenched and expansionist operating agencies like the International Health Board and the China Medical Board. Vincent's greatest problem was preventing these agencies from coopting the Foundation's income and blocking initiatives in areas where he and his staff wanted to take a leading role. Vincent was in a double bind: large new projects might break the monopoly of vested interests like Rose's IHB, but they might also break the bank by creating more expensive baronies. The pattern of Vincent's presidency (1917-1928) was one of tentative initiatives followed by retrenchment, of grand schemes left unfulfilled. This pattern is evident in the Foundation's dependence on the NRC.
The Foundation had a clear opportunity to take the lead in the medical and behavioral sciences, given its preeminence in medicine and public health and the Rockefeller family's patronage of mental health and social behavior through the Bureau of Social Hygiene and the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. Raymond Fosdick, a trustee and an influential lawyer-reformer, played a role in the Rockefeller circles analogous to Root's in the Carnegie network. Like Root, Fosdick was politically well-connected and had a lively interest in science as a The reform impulse did not disappear, however; it was expressed in different ways as reformers' strategies changed. Prewar political and propaganda campaigns to legislate a new social and moral order were largely abandoned (with the notable exception of Prohibition). They were succeeded in the 1920s by numerous specialized reform movements aimed at particular local or occupational communities. The overtly moralistic character of prewar reform gave way to a more managerial rhetoric; but the language of cooperation was infused with moral import, suggesting again that older habits of thought had simply taken new forms. The large foundations and voluntary health agencies took responsibility for social services that had once been wholly private and would soon become largely public. They were quasi-public agencies for social development.
The ideals of community development are exemplified in another way by trade associations, which acted as quasi-public agencies for industrial development. to reap the benefits of collective action without giving up traditional habits of laissez faire. The similarity to the scientific research councils is striking-hence my suggestion that the NRC was a trade association for science. The idea of community development is useful for historical analysis because of the consistency of organization, ideals, and behavior of social welfare foundations, voluntary health agencies, the NRC and SSRC, and the trade associations. Like any such concept, however, it is useful only within its proper limits. We should not presume that there was a community of science in the 1920s; there was not. What united NRC activists like Hale, Millikan, and Noyes with patrons like Ruml, Angell, Embree, and Rose was a vision of cooperative, self-regulating research communities. The ideal was imperfectly realized, of course, but it makes sense of what was done by those who strove to make it real.
LASTING EFFECTS
What then were the effects of foundation programs on the organization and practice of science? Of course, the effects were far greater in some sciences than in others. For obvious reasons, private foundations steered clear of sciences that were amply supported by government or industries. Rooted in nineteenth-century traditions of voluntary public health, education, and social control, foundations naturally favored areas of science that were related in some way to such concerns. This pattern is clear from Eduard Lindemann's analysis of foundation expenditures (see Table 11 ). Large expenditures on astronomy and physics suggest the continuing appeal to philanthropists of traditionally elite academic disciplines, despite all the rhetoric of the economic benefits of science. Low expenditures on chemistry, geology, agriculture, and forestry point historians of those disciplines to the richer connections with industry and government established between 1880 and 1910. Strong support of neurology, psychiatry, and mental hygiene reminds us of the moral and behavioral aspects of nineteenth-century reform. American leadership in the biobehavioral sciences after 1920 owes much to the conjunction of the postwar enthusiasm for basic science with older philanthropic interests in behavior and social control.
The effects of foundation grants on practice within the biobehavioral sciences are more difficult to discern, because the foundations' role cannot be considered apart from the role of other patrons and of contending interests within the sciences. For example, some historians lay the responsibility for a reductionist, scientistic bias in the social and behavioral sciences at the door of foundations. This one-sided view neglects the many other reasons, social and intellectual, for scientists to adopt such values. 63 The obvious place to look for direct effects of foundation programs is the organization of scientific institutions. Organizing is what philanthropists knew how to do, after all, and what they set out to do in science. By providing development funds to university departments, foundations made it possible for universities to preserve a research role, tilting the balance against those who favored a separation of research from teaching. Foundation support of the research councils was instrumental in creating a strong national scientific elite in a geographically widely dispersed system in which localism and individualism were still a habit for many scientists. Foundation participation was crucial to the new social networks of communication and influence that shaped science between the wars.
Foundations also altered the pecking order of universities. The large foundations' policy of concentration on regional centers gave up-and-coming universities the leverage to join the elite research universities. 64 The role of Carnegie and Rockefeller grants in the spectacular rise of Caltech is well documented, but the rise of Vanderbilt, Duke, and other universities in the South and Southwest is no less a result of a philanthropic tradition that had its roots in the reconstruction of the South. State and technical universities too turned to foundations in the 1930s. 65 The alliance of large foundations, elite research universities, and the NRC constituted a distinct region or subsector of the science system, comparable to the alliances of land-grant universities and federal bureaus, and of R & D-intensive industries and elite engineering schools. In each of these subsystems, institutionalized channels for exchanging resources, manpower, and services structured opportunities for growth and innovation in particular fields of science, in ways that have just begun to be explored.
